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The nature of education that children with disabilities should receive has been
subject to much debate. This article critically assesses the ways in which the
international human rights framework has conceptualised ‘inclusive education’.
It argues that the right to education for children with disabilities in international
law is constitutive of hidden contradictions and conditionality. This is most evi-
dent with respect to conceptualisations of ‘inclusion’ and ‘support’, and their
respective emphases upon the extent of individual impairment or ‘deﬁcit’ rather
than upon the extent of institutional or structural deﬁcit. It is vital that the new
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pays close attention to the
utilisation of these concepts lest the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities further legitimises the ‘special needs’ educational discourse to which
children with disabilities have been subject.
Keywords: rights of children with disabilities; inclusive education; international
law
Points of interest
• This article looks at what international law has said about the right to educa-
tion for disabled children and whether they should be educated in special
schools or mainstream schools.
• Different countries have different views on what ‘inclusion’ means for dis-
abled children and what inclusive education looks like.
• International law has not given countries a clear message about the best way
to educate disabled children.
• It is hoped that the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities will provide an opportunity for positive change and for dis-
abled people’s voices to be heard about how they want to be educated.
Introduction
The importance of education as a right in and of itself, and as a ‘passkey’ (United
Nations 2001a) to the enjoyment of other rights and freedoms, is clearly established
in international human rights law. The right to education for everyone is also a fea-
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ture of regional human rights instruments and domestic law. In 1954 the US
Supreme Court, in a landmark decision afﬁrming the discriminatory nature of racial
segregation in schools, asserted: ‘it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education’ (Brown
v Board of Education 1954). Over 50 years later, the educational segregation of
many children with disabilities in special schools remains common practice. The
individualised discourse upon which ‘special’ education is predominantly based
plays a crucial role in constructing and sustaining exclusionary practices, and in
perpetuating the ‘otherness’ of children with disabilities both within and outside the
education system (Runswick-Cole and Hodge 2009). Nor are concepts of ‘integra-
tion’ and ‘inclusion’ problem free, each having been attributed different meanings
in their implicit and explicit forms (Armstrong, Armstrong, and Spandagou 2010;
Slee 2006). The largely unproblematised manner in which segregative and superﬁ-
cially inclusive practices have persisted across UN Member States raises the ques-
tion of the extent to which the international human rights framework has itself
socialised States to such behaviour. Indeed, ‘unless disabled children … are treated
with respect by the legislation governing their educational rights, those involved in
their education will not be encouraged to do the same’ (Fortin 2005, 378).
The role of international human rights law as a framework for action and in pre-
senting a set of standards against which States can assess and amend existing edu-
cational practices is crucial. Goodman and Jinks have highlighted the ways in
which the international human rights framework can play a crucial persuasive role
by convincing state actors of the ‘truth, validity, or appropriateness of a norm,
belief or practice’ and by inducing behavioural change through processes of sociali-
sation and acculturation (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 635). Whilst critical analysis of
the concepts of ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’ are not new in themselves, their explo-
ration in the context of international human rights law has received scant attention.
It is the latter which is the focus of this article. The way(s) in which international
law conceptualises integration and inclusion has signiﬁcant implications for inﬂu-
encing States to ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ behaviour in this regard, not least in establishing
what constitutes un/acceptable educational practice. The legitimating role of human
rights discourse is of particular signiﬁcance for children with disabilities and for
whom substantive and ‘linguistic variety’ (United Nations 1999b, 13) with respect
to the ways in which children with disabilities should be educated, and their educa-
bility more generally, has been particularly pertinent.
This article explores the right to education for children with disabilities under
international human rights law. It discusses the ways in which human rights law
has conceptualised inclusive education, and critically assesses the extent to which
the international human rights community has challenged or perpetuated the loca-
tion of children with disabilities within a deﬁcit-based ‘special needs’ framework
with respect to education. Particular attention is paid to the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC), including the Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child to the most recent periodic reports of the 27
EU Member States, and the more recent UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities 2006 (CRPD). Widely hailed as reﬂective of a ‘paradigm shift’ in
rights discourse for people with disabilities, the article examines whether this is an
accurate reﬂection of the CRPD with respect to education. The article concludes
with some critical reﬂections on the ways in which the international human rights
framework can itself become part of the problem rather than the solution. It sug-
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gests that the recent emphasis on ‘inclusion’ within human rights law is somewhat
misleading and, in its current form(s), represents little more than reconstituted and
institutionalised conceptions of integration and normalisation. Thus, the legitimating
role of human rights law risks becoming something of a double-edged sword when
its articulation of the prescribed and proscribed becomes characterised by ‘hidden
contradictions’ (Shildrick 2005, 9) and conditionality, and whereby practices of
‘inclusion’ are grounded in the taken for granted rules of a non-disabled arbitrary
for whom the phrase ‘Welcome into my world’ is intransigent. The terms ‘disability’
and ‘disabilities’ as used in this article refer to the range of oppressive practices
and barriers by which an individual is disabled by society. This includes attitudinal,
physical, environmental, social and economic barriers and encompasses institutional
and systemic forms of discrimination (for example, Barnes 1991; Finkelstein 1980;
Oliver 1990, 1996). Tensions between the phrases ‘disabled people’ and ‘people
with disabilities’ in this context are respectfully recognised and acknowledged. The
decision to use ‘people with disabilities’, however, is reﬂective of the international
legal context upon which this article focuses, and the formalised usage and adoption
of the term in international legal documents including the CRPD.
Distinguishing between integration and inclusion
The disempowering effects of segregated education such as isolation, stigma, low
self-esteem, and restricted access to the full range of educational opportunities are
well documented (for example, Armstrong and Barton 1999; Barnes, Mercer, and
Shakespeare 2002; Judge 2003; Oliver 1996; Rieser 2000). A segregated system, in
essence, reﬂects the experiences and views of a majority non-disabled population
for whom impairment or disability in its individualised form is considered undesir-
able, and a hindrance to the educational and economic development of the majority.
As such, segregation is understood as a ‘fundamental part of the discriminatory pro-
cess’ (Barnes 1991, 42), ‘transplant[ing] the failings of mass education into the
minds and bodies of disabled children’ (Goodley 2010, 138). The move from segre-
gation towards integration, and more recently inclusion, has not been without difﬁ-
culty: the two terms have been, and continue to be, used interchangeably without
due recognition of their distinctiveness (Armstrong, Armstrong, and Spandagou
2010; Connor and Ferri 2007). Simply because the numbers of children with dis-
abilities attending mainstream schools has been increasing, and has been subse-
quently labelled ‘inclusive practice’, does not mean that the disabled child has full
access to the curriculum or is fully included in all aspects of school life. Rather,
segregation can take on invisible forms (Riddell 2007), with many disabled children
‘expected to ﬁt into existing schooling arrangements’ (Goodley 2010, 141). Prac-
tices of integration can thus be understood as little more than a form of mere assim-
ilation.
In contrast, inclusion ‘necessitates the removal of the material, ideological, polit-
ical and economic barriers that legitimate and reproduce in equality and discrimina-
tion in the lives of disabled people’ (Barton and Armstrong 2001, 214) According
to this view, an identiﬁcation of barriers within the school’s environment, teaching
and learning strategies, and attitudes that prevent the full participation of children
with disabilities, will also be required.
The deﬁnition and applicability within international law of terms such as ‘inte-
gration’ and ‘inclusion’ has particular implications in determining the nature of edu-
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cational rights that children with disabilities can claim. Clearly, an international
framework that seeks to challenge disabling practices as deﬁned by a social model
of disability (for example, Finkelstein 1980, 1993; Barnes 1991; Oliver 1990, 1996)
has the potential to be much more empowering and far-reaching than that which
seeks to ‘cure’ and ‘rehabilitate’ children with disabilities to a ‘normal’ state. Like-
wise for an international framework that codiﬁes a substantive right to inclusive
education rather than segregation or mere assimilation. However, when used synon-
ymously to refer to little more than integration, the concept of inclusion risks
becoming misleading, ideologically meaningless and riddled with ambiguities; remi-
niscent of a sheep in lion’s clothing. Just as the ‘context of education policy creates
the conditions for exclusion that militate against … inclusive’ education (Slee 2001,
172), so too does the international human rights framework risk doing the same.
The way in which inclusion is conceptualised also has particular implications for
the extent of obligations placed upon States Parties and state actors as duty bearers
under international human rights law, and in determining which and what kind of
practices might constitute a human rights violation. As Mutua observes, there is a
danger that ‘[o]nce a claim achieves the status of a human right, it acquires the aura
of irreversibility, irrevocability, timelessness, and universal validity’ (2007, 558).
Thus, the role of the international human rights regime in deﬁning and articulating
the prescribed and proscribed through the legitimation of human rights claims takes
on particular importance in shaping the educational experiences of children with
disabilities at national level.
Approaches to inclusion in international human rights law
The right to education for children with disabilities has been addressed directly and
indirectly by ‘soft’ (i.e. non-binding) and binding international law. While the Stan-
dard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 1993
and the Salamanca Statement 1994 have asserted an explicit right to education for
children with disabilities, as soft law these were morally rather than legally binding
upon States. A general right to education for everyone was proclaimed by Article
26 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948. This was reafﬁrmed and
made binding by Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR) and Articles 28 and 29 of the CRC. Children
with disabilities are not expressly referred to in the text of Article 13 of the
ICESCR or Articles 28 and 29 of the CRC. However, their explicit entitlement to
this right has been made clear by their respective monitoring bodies; the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Committee on the Rights of the
Child in their General Comments. In addition, the CRC, for the ﬁrst time in interna-
tional law, prohibited discrimination on the grounds of disability and included an
article speciﬁc to children with disabilities. Not only do children with disabilities
have the right to receive an education without discrimination and to express their
views on educational matters affecting them, but to be provided with assistance to
ensure that access to such education is ‘effective’. The provision and extent of this
assistance is, however, heavily dependent upon the availability of resources.
International law in its various forms has sought to address the question of edu-
cational placement for children with disabilities. Its success in effectively doing so
is questionable and, it is argued, constitutive of hidden contradictions and condi-
tional inclusion; that is, the burden of change continues to be placed upon children
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with disabilities, their ‘ability’ to adjust to naturalised pedagogies, to ‘cope’ and
overcome their impairment to become ‘one of us’ as opposed to a somewhat bur-
densome ‘minority of one’. There is a danger that discourses of conditional inclu-
sion, as framed by international law, will contribute to hiding enduring problems
and processes of exclusion within States instead of highlighting and challenging
them. Rule 6 of the 1993 Standard Rules calls upon States to accommodate children
with disabilities within ‘integrated settings’ and to ensure that the education of chil-
dren with disabilities is ‘an integral part of the educational system’. In so doing,
adequate accessibility and support services should be provided. The Rules also
allow for special education to be considered ‘in situations where the general school
system does not yet adequately meet the needs of all persons with disabilities’. Seg-
regated education is here viewed as a temporary measure, aimed at ‘preparing chil-
dren with disabilities for education in the general school system’. This sense of
‘preparing’ children with disabilities as a prerequisite for their general inclusion is
indicative of an underlying assumption of needing to ‘restore’ the child to a level
of ‘normality’ that enables them to readily adapt and ‘ﬁt in’ to the mainstream edu-
cation system, subsequently ‘allowing’ their educational rights to be more effec-
tively realised. In so doing, special education is framed as a mechanism for
advancing the goal of inclusion (Armstrong, Armstrong, and Spandagou 2010, 32).
It is debateable whether inclusive education can be fully realised whilst the option
to segregate remains (Kenworthy and Whittaker 2000).
The Standard Rules were followed by the UNESCO Salamanca Statement and
Framework for Action on Special Needs Education in 1994. This Statement calls
upon governments to adopt the principle of inclusive education, enrolling all chil-
dren in regular schools ‘unless there are compelling reasons for doing otherwise’
(Salamanca Statement 1994, Section 3); for example, ‘when it is required for the
welfare of the child or that of other children’. It is interesting to note that nowhere
in international law is the education of children without disabilities subject to the
welfare of children with disabilities. The Statement and its Framework for Action is
further peppered by the interchangeable use of ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’, and the
‘special needs’ of children with disabilities. Whilst the dominant discourse of the
time, the continued usage of the latter in international law has served only to mask
‘a practice of stratiﬁcation which continues to determine children’s educational
careers by assigning to them an identity deﬁned by an administrative label’
(Skidmore 2004, 5).
The conservatism of the right to ‘inclusive’ education in binding international
law, prior to the CRPD, can be inferred from the work of the Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
While both the ICESCR and the CRC are themselves silent on the issue, their
respective monitoring bodies have, albeit to varying degrees, elaborated upon the
educational rights of adults and children with disabilities in their General Com-
ments. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has afﬁrmed that
educational institutions and programmes for everyone should be available, accessi-
ble, acceptable and adaptable, and that the prohibition against discrimination applies
‘fully and immediately to all aspects of education’ (United Nations 1999a, 31). This
would appear to offer much potential for effectively realising the educational rights
of children with disabilities. However, this oft-cited 4-A Schema has not been uti-
lised with respect to the education of children with disabilities. Its 1994 General
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Comment on people with disabilities pays scant attention to educational rights,
simply referring to the Standard Rules and stating that:
In order to implement such an approach, States should ensure that teachers are trained
to educate children with disabilities within regular schools and that the necessary
equipment and support are available to bring persons with disabilities up to the same
level of education as their non-disabled peers. (United Nations 1994, 35)
There is no requirement for the curriculum to be adapted for children with disabili-
ties other than for support to be provided to enable children with disabilities to
access an already existing curriculum and pre-existing educational practices more
generally. That such support should be aimed at ‘bringing persons with disabilities
up to’ the same level of education as their non-disabled peers places the onus upon
children with disabilities to overcome individual ‘deﬁcits’. The educational system
itself escapes problematisation.
The elaboration of the right to education by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child would appear to have positive implications for the educational rights and
placement of children with disabilities. In its ﬁrst General Comment, on the aims of
education, the Committee recognised the pervasive discrimination experienced by
children with disabilities in educational settings and stipulated that the right to edu-
cation for all children is not only a matter of access, but also of content, educational
processes, pedagogical methods, and the environment in which education takes
place (United Nations 2001b). Also, ‘approaches which do no more than seek to
superimpose the aims and values of education on the existing system without
encouraging any deeper changes are clearly inadequate’ (United Nations 2001b,
18). Signiﬁcantly, debate during the Day of General Discussion held by the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child on the rights of children with disabilities high-
lighted the distinction between concepts of integration and inclusion, recognising
that ‘policies of integration tended to seek to change the child in order to ﬁt into
the school. Inclusion, on the other hand, sought to change the school environment
in order to meet the needs of the disabled child’ (United Nations 1997).
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has paid attention to issues of educa-
tional placement in its General Comment on children with disabilities, clearly stat-
ing that ‘inclusive education should be the goal’ (United Nations 2006, 66).
However, it adopts a rather contradictory and somewhat confusing approach to
inclusion. Its conceptualisation as a ‘goal’ rather than a ‘right’ is itself problematic.
The Committee goes on to emphasise that:
the extent of inclusion within the general education system may vary … Inclusion
may range from full-time placement of all students with disabilities into one regular
classroom or placement into the regular classroom with varying degree of inclusion,
including a certain portion of special education. (United Nations 2006, 66)
The latter is a clear example of the way in which the concept of inclusion can
become heavily diluted, and its ‘original reformist intent’ seriously undermined
(Slee 2006, 113). It is clear that the Committee’s understanding is extremely broad
and subsequently lacking. Inclusion here appears to be an all-encompassing con-
cept. The feasibility and extent of inclusion is presented here as being primarily
determined by the individual child. Of course it would undoubtedly be inappropriate
for any child to be educated in a system where his or her needs are not being met.
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What is at issue here is the extent to which less than full forms of inclusion become
legitimised and accepted because of the extent of an individual child’s impairment
and the challenges that child poses, and not because of the inadequacy of the pre-
existing educational system. This ﬂawed approach has been highlighted more gener-
ally by commentators such as Kenworthy and Whittaker (2000) and Rioux (2007)
who have observed that, more often than not, the onus remains on the individual
child to ﬁt within the existing education system rather than vice versa. Thus the dis-
abled child becomes understood in international law as the barrier to their own edu-
cational inclusion. Whilst stipulating that ‘inclusion should not be understood nor
practiced as simply integrating children into the regular system regardless of their
challenges and needs’, the elasticity which the Committee attaches to ‘inclusion’
renders it largely meaningless.
The issue of educational placement arises in the Committee’s Concluding Obser-
vations to 17 of the 27 EU Member States. Despite the Committee’s apparent rec-
ognition of the distinction between ‘inclusion’ and ‘integration’ during the Day of
General Discussion, and their conceptual development within academic literature
more generally, this has not been consistently adhered to in its Concluding Observa-
tions. For example, in its 2003 response to Cyprus, the Committee expressed con-
cern about the broad scope of special schools for children with ‘physical, mental or
emotional needs’ that ‘is not conducive to the integration of those children into
mainstream schools’ (United Nations 2003a, 51). In the same year the Committee
welcomed the efforts of the Czech Republic in integrating children with disabilities
into mainstream education and welcomed the ‘widespread inclusion of children with
disabilities in mainstream schools’ in Italy (United Nations 2003b, 8g). The Com-
mittee also recommended that children with disabilities were integrated in main-
stream schools in its responses to reports by Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Poland,
Portugal, and Malta. Of particular interest is the Committee’s response to Luxem-
bourg’s second report in 2005, in which it challenged the exclusion of children with
behavioural and/or learning disabilities from mainstream schools and their place-
ment in ‘facilities for mentally and physically disabled children’ (United Nations
2005, 48-9). However, it made no attempt to challenge segregated forms of educa-
tion for children with mental and physical disabilities, sending a message to the
State Party that such practices remain acceptable.
A somewhat more positive approach can be discerned in the Committee’s Con-
cluding Observations to EU Member States from 2006. In its Concluding Observa-
tions to Lithuania (2006), Hungary (2006), the United Kingdom (2008), Romania
(2009) and Belgium (2010) we can see a much more consistent general approach to
‘inclusion’ and calls for States Parties to ensure inclusive education for children
with disabilities in mainstream settings. This is perhaps a result of the Committee’s
General Comment on children with disabilities, which was adopted in 2006, as well
as a nod to the CRPD that was adopted in December 2006, and to which the Com-
mittee made reference. However, given the diluted approach to inclusion taken in
the latter Comment, the strength of this message remains unclear, and there is a
danger that the Committee becomes blinkered by and perpetuates mere integration.
Attention to the qualitative aspects of education has received only scant attention
throughout its Concluding Observations. For example, in 2003 the Committee
called upon Estonia to remove physical barriers to enable effective access of chil-
dren with disabilities to schools, but did not pay attention to the range of other bar-
riers prohibiting inclusion and participation. Other responses have focused only on
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the need for teaching staff to receive adequate training. Nowhere in its Concluding
Observations has any attention been granted to, for example, the design of the cur-
riculum, disabling rules and procedures, communication issues, classroom materials
and the provision of resources in accessible formats. Whilst the Committee cannot
possibly address all issues in its Concluding Observations, the limited approach it
has adopted is disappointing and renders invisible the plethora of barriers experi-
enced by children with disabilities in the educational system. This weak concept of
inclusion perpetuated by the Committee risks masking and legitimating a multitude
of sins.
New directions? The CRPD
The CRPD and its Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 13 December 2006. It opened for signature on 30 March 2007
and came into force on 3 May 2008. The ﬁrst textual explication of both adults and
children with disabilities in an international human rights treaty, the CRPD has been
variously hailed as ‘ground breaking’ (Waddington 2008, 111), ‘historic and path-
breaking’ (Melish 2007, 37), and the ‘dawn of a new era’ (United Nations Secretary
General 2006). It is safe to say that the CRPD has generated extremely high expec-
tations of urgent and effective redress for the human rights violations experienced
by people with disabilities across the world. To say that the issue of educational
placement was a source of debate in the drafting process is something of an under-
statement. Each stage of the negotiations elicited extensive reactions from States
Parties and civil society, and it was not until the ﬁnal session in 2006 that the draft
began to resemble its ﬁnal form. Different approaches were identiﬁed by members
of the Ad Hoc Committee in delineating the relationship between ‘special’ educa-
tion and mainstream education. Some members of the Ad Hoc Committee consid-
ered that the education of children with disabilities in the general education system
should be the rule while others thought that ‘specialist’ education services should
not only be provided where the general education system was inadequate but made
available at all times without a presumption that one approach was more desirable
than the other.
Article 24 of the CRPD establishes the right to education for all persons with
disabilities without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity. It builds
upon the ICESCR and the CRC by setting out in detail the actions States Parties
need to take in order to ensure this right for children (and adults) with disabilities.
As such, it encompasses both positive and negative duties. Although children with
disabilities were implicitly covered by the right to education in other treaties, their
textual invisibility has proved problematic and they have instead had to rely on the
observations and statements of treaty monitoring bodies for clariﬁcation on the con-
tent of this right. The formal and detailed articulation of a right to education for
children with disabilities herein is thus signiﬁcant and would appear to be far-reach-
ing. Signiﬁcantly, it requires States Parties to ensure an ‘inclusive education system
at all levels’. The aims of an inclusive education system are threefold; ﬁrstly, the
full development of human potential and sense of dignity and self-worth, and the
strengthening of respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and human diver-
sity; secondly, the development by people with disabilities of their personality, tal-
ents and creativity, as well as their mental and physical abilities, to their fullest
potential; and, ﬁnally, to enable people with disabilities to participate effectively in
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a free society (CRPD, Article 24(1)). Whilst articulating the aims to which such a
system should be directed, no attempt is made to explicitly deﬁne what is meant by
‘inclusion’ other than to state that children with disabilities should not be excluded
from the general education system on the basis of disability, and that they should
receive the support required within the general education system to facilitate their
effective education. This would appear to signify a positive approach to inclusion;
one wherein the presumption is in favour of education in mainstream settings, with
the provision of support to ensure that education really is inclusive and not reduced
to mere integration. No attempt was made during the negotiation process to deﬁne
‘inclusion’ or to include any such deﬁnition in Article 2 of the CRPD, which
explicitly deﬁnes the terms ‘communication’, ‘language’, ‘discrimination on the
basis of disability’, ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘universal design’ for the pur-
poses of the Convention. The remainder of Article 24 does elaborate further on
what would appear to be the prerequisites for an inclusive education system. For
example, States Parties are required to ensure that ‘effective individualised support
measures’ are provided in environments that ‘maximise academic and social devel-
opment, consistent with the goal of full inclusion’ and for ‘reasonable accommoda-
tion of the individual’s requirements’. Further measures required include: facilitating
the learning of Braille and alternative means of communication; the learning of sign
language; and ensuring that staff in education settings receive a range of training in,
for example, disability awareness and communication approaches.
It will be up to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to clar-
ify the parameters of inclusion as its work progresses. By explicitly obligating
States Parties to take measures in respect of the above, Article 24 goes further than
either soft law and the ICESCR or the CRC, by making binding and articulating
more clearly how the right to education is to be realised for children with disabili-
ties. In this way, Article 24 becomes an ‘authoritative guide for human action’
(Goodman and Jinks 2004, 641). Interestingly, although the Committee on the
Rights of the Child has elaborated on what it understands by ‘inclusion’, the usage
of the term within the body of the CRPD appears to have induced some discomfort
within the former Committee and there appears to be some implicit feeling that the
CRPD potentially goes too far or places too much pressure on educational institu-
tions to become fully inclusive. In its General Comment on the rights of children
with disabilities, the Committee on the Rights of the Child noted:
[T]he explicit commitment towards the goal of inclusive education contained in the
draft convention on the rights of persons with disabilities … However, the Committee
underlines that the extent of inclusion within the general education system may vary.
(United Nations 2006, 67)
It will be highly interesting to see in the coming years not only what impact the
CRPD and its Committee will have in persuading and/or acculturating States Parties
to inclusive educational practices – that is, in inducing vertical internalisation of
norms – but in persuading and/or acculturating other treaty monitoring bodies of
the value of fully inclusive educational practices – that is, in inducing horizontal
internalisation of norms. It is important, however, not to get carried away with what
would appear to be the strengths of Article 24 and the detail contained therein. The
reference to ‘environments which maximise academic and social development’,
albeit that these are consistent with the goal of full inclusion, may emerge as prob-
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lematic. It appears, to some degree, to be a reconstituted version of previous provi-
sions in, for example, the Standard Rules 1993, which called for segregated educa-
tion to be considered ‘in situations where the general school system does not yet
adequately meet the needs of all persons with disabilities’, and aimed at ‘preparing
children with disabilities for education in the general school system’ (Rule 6, Stan-
dard Rules 1993). The language in Article 24 is interesting: it does not refer to
‘inclusive environments’ or state that such environments should be consistent with
inclusion full stop, but rather with the goal of full inclusion, indicating a process
towards inclusion. Such a provision is potentially diluting and reﬂective of the
‘smoke and mirrors’ that sometimes characterise international human rights law.
Whilst the term ‘special’ is omitted from Article 24, extensive reference is made to
‘individualised support’ and not on the role of States Parties in eradicating those
structural barriers that prohibit the effective participation and inclusion of children
with disabilities in the mainstream education system. As such, emphasis remains on
the difﬁculties children themselves have with legitimised practices of teaching and
learning and not on the difﬁculties that emanate directly from the construction and
naturalisation of such practices by and for a non-disabled majority. The language of
support focuses on changing the individual person with a disability and assisting
them to rectify or overcome perceived individual deﬁcit. The legitimation of such
practices is indicative of the normative power of rights and their role in unwittingly
perpetuating less than inclusive practice. In contrast to the alternative, the focus on
functional solutions and individual support is ‘safe’ and ‘easy’.
The CRPD cause has been taken up by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child in all of its concluding observations to EU member states post 2006; post
adoption of the CRPD. For example, in 2010 the Committee on the Rights of the
Child welcomed Belgium’s ratiﬁcation of the CRPD and its Optional Protocol, and,
between 2006 and 2010, called upon Bulgaria, France, Netherlands, Romania, Slo-
vakia and the United Kingdom to ratify both the CRPD and its Optional Protocol.
It could be asserted not only that the CRPD has the capacity to ‘persuade’ or
‘acculturate’ States Parties to ‘perform better’ (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 102) with
respect to their educational endeavours, but likewise in facilitating the development
or, rather the reﬁning, of educational norms among other treaty monitoring bodies,
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child in particular. The adoption of the lat-
ter’s General Comment on the rights of children with disabilities in 2006, following
the ﬁnal session of CRPD negotiations, and the more consistent use of language
and engagement with the right to education for children with disabilities in its Con-
cluding Observations to EU Member States post 2006 suggest that the CRPD itself
may be having a ‘trickle effect’ in the work of other treaty bodies. Although some
differences appear to have already emerged around understandings of inclusion, for
example, such differences in themselves contribute to a process of dialogue and
debate in the clariﬁcation of rights content. In this sense, then, it is perhaps disap-
pointing that Article 24 of the CRPD focuses so heavily on individualised measures
of support given the opportunity for horizontal, as well as vertical, persuasion and
acculturation that exists.
Given that its Committee has not yet elaborated upon the content of this right,
and has produced only a handful of Concluding Observations, it remains to be seen
just how narrowly or broadly the concept of inclusion will be utilised and deﬁned.
Will the Committee be critical of States Parties who insist on maintaining segre-
gated forms of learning? Will they be consistent in their approach to inclusion or
10 B. Byrne
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adopt a quantitative approach to inclusion? The CRPD undoubtedly spells out the
right to education for children with disabilities in international law in much greater
detail than has hitherto been the case. This, alongside omission of any reference to
‘special needs’, is progress from that which has come before. It is the ﬁrst time in
binding international law that any reference has been made to ‘inclusion’ in a treaty
text, and for this reason alone is to be welcomed. However this level of progress is
somewhat diluted by continuing emphasis upon forms of support required by the
individual to access existing pedagogies rather than upon barriers to inclusion
erected by educational institutions and discourses themselves, which become mani-
fest through inter alia disabling rules and procedures, curriculum design, and
naturalised forms of expression. We must thus be mindful of the ways in which
such approaches can constitute conservation strategies for a State Party, giving rise
to ‘conditional inclusion’ and a conditional human rights discourse for children with
disabilities more generally.
Conclusion
That children with disabilities have a general right to education is beyond dispute.
What is called into question is the parameters of that right; speciﬁcally, the extent
to which this has been suitably clariﬁed and consistently applied by the interna-
tional human rights framework. This article has sought to problematise the individu-
alised assumptions that have pervaded human rights discourse by questioning the
legitimating practices and ‘safe’ parameters of international human rights law with
respect to the right to inclusive education for children with disabilities. The form
and content of the right to education accorded to children with disabilities in inter-
national law has continued to locate children with disabilities within a ‘special
needs’ discourse in constituted and reconstituted forms. This has been most evident
through attempts by the international human rights framework to address issues of
educational placement for children with disabilities. Undoubtedly a complex and
challenging issue for the Committee, not least in obtaining consensus among States
Parties, the lack of clarity with which this has been addressed has created space for
the legitimation of exclusionary practices within States Parties. The language of
‘special needs’ and ‘integration’ has been a common feature of the work of the
Committee on the Rights of Child. Attempts made by the Committee on the Rights
of the Child to adopt a more consistent approach to ‘inclusion’ more recently have
been problematic, and the term has been used to indicate practices of mere integra-
tion rather than inclusive practices per se. Indeed, the Committee’s attempt to estab-
lish the boundaries of ‘inclusion’ has rendered the concept largely meaningless
since it is subsequently impossible to discern the extent or nature of inclusion it is
referring to. There is a danger that ‘inclusion’, as utilised by the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, merely becomes a new way to describe and legitimise age old
norms.
International human rights law has conditionalised the right to inclusive educa-
tion for children with disabilities by making inclusion contingent upon the extent of
individual rather than institutional or structural deﬁcits. These declarations of ‘inclu-
sion’ have failed to sufﬁciently challenge the rules on which the immanent struc-
tures of the game are based. As such, the taken-for-granted rules and ‘ablist’
discourse upon which educational systems and institutions are based go unchal-
lenged. In emphasising the relationship between the effective realisation of the right
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to education for children with disabilities and the extent of individual impairment,
there emerges the paradox that children with disabilities themselves become a par-
tial or indirect duty bearer, wherein States are relieved of accountability in
instances where the needs of the individual child become too challenging, expensive
or ‘burdensome’. This form of domination becomes self-perpetuating and may cre-
ate new patterns of participation by accepting only those children who have ‘right’
kinds of disability and are able to successfully become ‘one of us’ by conforming
to normalised ideals. The international human rights framework has done little to
challenge such practices. It remains to be seen just how the Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities will fare with respect to the elaboration and
monitoring of this right. Hopes are high and opportunities for challenging the spe-
cial needs and less than inclusive discourse that has prevailed have been reignited.
It is thus with a watchful eye that the activities and commentary of the Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will be followed in years to come.
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